We develop the logic of assessment of sperm competition risk by individual males where the mechanism of sperm competition follows a`loaded ra¥e' (¢rst and second inseminates of a female have unequal prospects). Male roles (¢rst or second to mate) are determined randomly. In model 1, males have no information about the risk associated with individual females and ejaculation strategy depends only on the probability, q, that females mate twice. Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) ejaculate expenditure increases linearly from zero with q, and reduces with increasing inequality between ejaculates, though the direction of the loading (which role is favoured) is unimportant. In model 2, males have perfect information and can identify each of three risk states: females that will (1) mate just once (`no risk'), (2) mate twice but have not yet mated (`future risk'), and (3) mate twice and have already mated (`past risk'). The ESS is to ejaculate minimally with`no risk' females, and to expend equally with`past' and future' risk females; the direction of the competitive loading is again unimportant. Expenditure again increases with risk, but is now non-zero at extremely low risk. Model 3 examines three cases of partial information where males can identify only one of the three risk states and cannot distinguish between the other two: they therefore have just two information sets or`contexts'. Expenditure in both contexts typically rises non-linearly from zero with q, but (whatever the loading direction) expenditure is higher in the context with higher risk (e.g. if contexts are`mated' and`virgin', males spend more with mated females). However, in highly loaded ra¥es, sperm expenditure can decrease over part of the range of risk. Also, the direction of the loading now a¡ects expenditure. Biological evidence for the predictions of the models is summarized and discussed.
I N T RO DUC T ION
The predicted response to sperm competition within a species can be very di¡erent from that predicted across species. Across species, average ejaculate expenditure is expected universally to increase with sperm competition level (see Parker 1998) . Within species, the reverse may apply. A simple model of group spawning in which males can assess the number of competitors predicted that as the number of males increases above two, ejaculate expenditure per male gradually reduces . This conclusion was upheld in a more complex analysis allowing continuous fertilization and strategic variation in sperm size, except that ejaculate e¡ort could decline as the number of males increases above one (Ball & Parker 1997) .
The present paper concerns assessment of sperm competition risk when sperm competition is much less intense. It relates to a species where typically for a proportion 17q of females, mating occurs only once before fertilization of their eggs, and for a proportion q, mating occurs twice so that the two ejaculates compete. Parameter q is seen as a range of sperm competition`risk' to distinguish it from a range of intensity', where several ejaculates compete for each set of eggs . Previous`risk' models predicted increased ejaculate expenditure with increased risk, viewed both across (Parker 1982) and within species (Parker 1990b) . Note that there is no con£ict with the above`intensity' model prediction . In`risk' models, we are solely concerned with the range between`no sperm competition' and`sperm competition' between just two ejaculates. In`intensity models' we investigate numbers of two and above ejaculates. There is growing evidence that males may change their ejaculate dose in response to local conditions relating to the risk of sperm competition (} 6) . The analysis relates mainly to internally fertilizing species, but also applies to external fertilizers in which either one or two ejaculates are typically involved in fertilization.
We here further develop the logic of assessment of sperm competition risk by males, by developing models of male ability to discriminate between female mating states. Biological evidence supports some of the predictions. In our ¢rst model, males have no information so that their ejaculation strategy is the same with all females, tuned only by the average risk, q, of doublemating. This is compared with the case of perfect information, where a male can identify, on encountering a female, what the mating pattern of that female is likely to be.We then examine three cases of imperfect information in which males can identify only one of three possible situations: (i) females that mate just once, (ii) females that have already mated, (iii) females that will mate again in the future. A companion paper (Ball & Parker 1998b ) analyses cases where males make mistakes: a male meeting a female in one situation has a ¢nite probability of identifying her as belonging to either of the other two situations.
Since the models developed here analyse how males should allocate sperm, for simplicity we do not include possible female strategies of sperm selection, despite their current interest (e.g. Zeh & Zeh 1996a,b) . Provided that female interests do not relate directly to male sperm allocation strategies, we do not anticipate qualitatively di¡erent conclusions by omitting female strategies.
. A NA LYS I S (a) De¢nitions of sperm competition risk
One of us (G.A.P.) recently discovered an unfortunate confusion in de¢nitions involving`risk' models in sperm competition games, stemming from the ¢rst approach (Parker 1982) and continuing into recent analyses (Parker 1984b (Parker , 1990b (Parker , 1993 Parker & Begon 1993; Birkhead & Parker 1997) . All these prior analyses relate to risk de¢ned strictly as the probability, p, that a given male, when mating, will face sperm competition from one other ejaculate.This is not equivalent to q, the probability of occurrence of sperm competition in the population (i.e. the females' probability of double-mating). During the prior analyses, p came to be regarded (incorrectly) as synonymous with q, when in fact all calculations actually related to p.
The relation between the two de¢nitions is easily de¢ned for an internally fertilizing species (the terminology can readily be altered to cover external fertilization). If q is the probability that females mate twice, in a population containing F receptive females there are F(1 À q) 2q F(1 q) matings per mating period, of which F(1 À q) are with females that mate once, and 2Fq are with females that mate twice (every double-mating involves two copulations). Of a total of F(1 q) matings, males face sperm competition on 2Fq occasions, so the probability that a male faces sperm competition at a given copulation is p 2qa(1 q), and the probability that he will not is 1 À p (1 À q)a(1 q).
Following previous approaches, we assume that q is determined extrinsically, i.e. it is not a function of male sperm allocation strategy (but, see Shapiro & Giraldeau 1996) .
Note also that if q is independent of the number of males and females, then p is also independent of sex ratio. We can readily envisage situations in which there are such dependencies (Ball & Parker 1998a ), but for simplicity these are not examined in the present analysis. ESS solutions in terms of p and q di¡er only in quantitative detail and not in qualitative predictions (p increases monotonically with q; p q at limits 0 and 1, and p5 q between the limits). Biologically, solutions are often most useful in terms of q. These versions are given here; they can readily be converted to solutions in p by substituting q pa(2 À p).
(b) Risk states, and knowledge contexts A male about to mate with a female with a given set of eggs may encounter three di¡erent sperm competition risk states (a more advanced analysis may allow more states): 0öthe female is a virgin that will mate now but not again; 1öthe female is a virgin that will mate now and again once; 2öthe female has mated once and will mate now but not again. The word`virgin' is de¢ned in this context in relation to a mating period, i.e. to the set of eggs competed for. These states may either be an intrinsic property of the female, or a property of her circumstances (e.g. another male is present or absent). A male's strategy speci¢es the number of sperm he ejaculates when he assesses a female to be in a given state, or set of states, e.g. s 0 öon assessing the female to be in state 0; s 1 öon assessing the female to be in state 1; s 0,1 ö on assessing the female to be in either state 0 or 1; etc. What a male should do depends on his ability to discriminate between the states. The present paper concerns special cases where males can recognize certain states, or sets of states, but cannot discriminate between others. What a male can identify is termed a context (`the conditions and circumstances that are relevant to an event'); it is equivalent to an information set. His strategy is a de¢nition of what he does in a given context. If, say, a male cannot discriminate between females in states 0, and 1, but can identify state 2 females, we would seek two strategies, s 0,1 and s 2, corresponding to the two contexts, (0,1) and (2). If males cannot discriminate at all, there is only one context (0,1,2), and we therefore investigate the single strategy s 0,1,2 . In a companion paper (Ball & Parker 1998b) , we examine the problem of misidenti¢cations of states (mistakes).
(c) General analysis
Techniques for analysis of sperm competition games have been given elsewhere (e.g. Parker 1993); the following serves as a general outline. Males can vary sperm numbers, s i , continuously in context i. Let s i * be the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS, Maynard Smith 1982) for sperm numbers in context i, and let strategy I be the ESS across all contexts (I is s * i ,s * j , F F F s * n ). Denoting W(s i , I) as the ¢tness of a rare mutant deviating by playing s i T s * i in a population playing I, we ¢nd the ESS by setting
to ensure that s i * is a maximum (e.g. see Maynard Smith 1982) . We assume that expenditure on gaining matings determines the number of matings a male achieves, and that his ejaculate expenditure determines the expected value of each mating. There is a trade-o¡ so that increasing ejaculate expenditure increases gain per mating, but reduces the number of matings (some evidence exists for such a trade-o¡; see Warner et al. 1995) .
A mutant male's ¢tness is his number of matings achieved, n(s i , I), times the expected value of each mating, v(s i , I):
and from equation (1a) this occurs when (Parker 1993 ):
where primes denote the di¡erential coe¤cients of n or v with respect to s i . Note that n' is negative. The exact forms of n and v depend on the model, and are dealt with separately. The general logic is as follows. Consider ¢rst nöthe number of matings achieved. Each male has a ¢xed total energy budget of R units, and the average cost of obtaining each mating (¢nding a female, etc.) is C units.The cost of each unit mass of ejaculate is D, so the cost of an ejaculate containing s i units of sperm is Ds i . R, C, and D are all expressed in the same energy units. Let å S i ae be the average sperm number per mating, averaged across all mating contexts, played by a mutant deviating only in context i, and let å S*ae be the same average for an I-player. Thus, where p i , p j , . . . etc. are the probabilities that a male mates in contexts i, j, . . . etc., S i (p i s i p j s * j F F F etc.), and S* (p i s* i p j s* j F F F etc.).
The number of matings gained by the mutant male is
In previous analyses, this quantity was expressed relative to the ESS number of matings per male Ra(C DhS*i), but such a scaling is redundant since it cancels out in equation (3), giving the same result as the unscaled version (4).
The function v(s i , I), the average value of each mating for a mutant playing ejaculate expenditure s i against an I population, depends on the probability and mechanism of sperm competition. We assume that the mechanism of sperm competition follows a`loaded ra¥e' (Parker 1990a) . When a female contains ejaculates from two males, sperm from the second is competitively weighted by a factor r, relative to sperm from the ¢rst. Thus, the proportionate gains to each male are: (s 1 a(s 1 rs 2 )) for male 1; and (rs 2 a(s 1 rs 2 )) for male 2.
(e) ESS ejaculate expenditures
The quantity we seek is the dimensionless value E i *, the ESS expenditure on the ejaculate by a male mating in context i, expressed as a proportion of the total cost of a mating (cost of acquiring a female and then mating), averaged across all contexts:
This yields solutions that are independent of constants C and D (see below). Expressions in terms of absolute sperm expenditure (Ds* i ) are required if, say, the biological e¡ects of C are to be investigated.
MODE L 1: M A L E S H AV E NO I N FOR M AT ION A B OU T R I S K
Here, a male has no information about the risk of sperm competition when he meets females. His strategy is shaped by the species-level risk of sperm competition between two ejaculates, q. We assume that when sperm competition occurs, a given male is equally likely to mate ¢rst or second (i.e. roles are random sensu Parker (1990a)), but that he has no information about roles. Thus, there is only one context and one strategy, s 0,1,2 , since the male must treat all matings equally. The average sperm number of the mutant is å S 0,1,2 ae s 0,1,2 , and the average for an ESS player is å S*ae s* 0,1,2 . Thus,
The average value of a mating for an s 0,1,2 -player in a population playing I is
Note that gains with the (17q) females that copulate only once are independent of s 0,1,2 , which cancels out since there is no sperm competition. For each such mating, a male encounters q females who will mate again in the future and q females who have already mated. We obtain
and from expression (3), equating (6) and (8) gives the ESS proportion of reproductive expenditure spent on the ejaculate (5) as
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For the case of a fair ra¥e, r 1.0, and each sperm is competitively equal whether transferred in the ¢rst or second ejaculate. Thus,
which is analogous to the result of Parker (1984 Parker ( , 1993 , that E * 0,1,2 pa(4 À 2p), and similar to the original solution E * 0,1,2 pa(4 À p) obtained by Parker (1982) using a di¡erent version of n. Equation (10) predicts that across the species in which sperm competition approximates to a fair ra¥e, relative ejaculate expenditure should increase from 0 to 0.5 as the probability of double-mating increases from 0 to 1.0 (¢gure 1). The solution in terms of p is equal to those in terms of q at 0 and 1, but curve E* 0,1,2 (p) is bowed below that of line E* 0,1,2 (q).
The e¡ect of competitive loading r, has not previously been investigated. In (9), we see that
(1 r À1 ) 2 ;
and that both are maximized at r 1.0 (i.e. under the conditions of a fair ra¥e). Hence, whether sperm in role 2 have e.g. twice the competitive weight of role 1öor vice versaömakes no di¡erence to the ESS, which is therefore una¡ected by the`loading direction'. The more loaded the ra¥e, the less the ESS ejaculate expenditure at any given risk, q (see ¢gure 1). Hence, we predict a greater deviation below the line for r 1.0 in a species where there is a high degree of loading in favour of one or other ejaculate (high ¢rst male advantage, or high second male advantage).
. MODE L 2 : M A L E S H AV E PE R F EC T I N FOR M AT ION A B OU T R I S K A N D ROL E
Here a male has perfect information. On encountering a female, he can identify whether a female has already mated, and if not, whether she will mate again in the future. He also therefore`knows' his role (1 ¢rst to mate, 2 second to mate), for cases when there will be sperm competition. Roles are again allocated randomly. On meeting a female that will not remate (probability (17q)/(1+q)), we assume that a male transfers an arbitrary minimum amount of sperm. Calling s 1 and s 2 the sperm strategies played in roles 1 and 2 (each occurring with probability q/(1+q)), the average number of sperm expended per mating by a mutant male playing s 1 T s* 1 in role 1, is hS i i q(s 1 s* 2 )a(1 q), and by a mutant playing s 2 T s * 2 in role 2, is hS 2 i q(s 2 s * 1 )a(1 q). We ¢nd that
where hS*i q(s * 1 s * 2 )a(1 q).
Remembering that a mutant playing s 1 T s * 1 in role 1, plays s * 2 in role 2 against an ESS player playing s * 1 , the average relative value of a mating for such a mutant is
For a mutant playing s 2 T s* 2 , v(s 2 , I)
and so combining (12) with (11a) and (11b) shows that at the ESS a male must play the same ejaculation strategies in both roles, i.e. s * 1 s * 2 . It is then easy to show that the ESS ejaculate expenditure with doublemating females is
Unlike model 1 (¢gure 1), (13) has a positive value even when q 0 (¢gure 2). Even when female states 1 and 2 are extremely rare, males can identify them. A male meeting a female in state 1`knows' that she will mate again in the future, and that a state 2 female has Figure 1 . Relation between ESS ejaculate expenditure (expressed as a proportion of total expenditure per mating), E * 0,1,2 , and the frequency of double mating in the population (risk q) when males have no information about female states, and hence ejaculate in only one context (0,1,2). The three lines are for three degrees of loading in the fertilization ra¥e: r 1.0 (bold line, fair ra¥e), 0.5 (each of male 2's sperm count only half those of male 1), and 0.1 (each of male 2's sperm count only one tenth those of male 1). mated in the past. Hence, despite their rarity, he must escalate ejaculate expenditure, in contrast to model 1, where states 1 and 2 cannot be identi¢ed, so that if their frequency approaches zero, a male should expend close to zero.
Note that (13) contains the same terms for r as (9). So again the`loading direction' (whether mating ¢rst or second is more favourable) does not in£uence the ESS expenditureöwhat matters is only the competitive di¡erence. Though the relative e¡ect of`role' is the same, the strength of the relationship between E* and q (cf. ¢gures 1 and 2) is less, because (13) has a positive intercept.
For the special case of the fair ra¥e (r 1.0),
see ¢gure 2. Since there are (17q)/(1 + q) matings with zero expenditure for every 2q/(1+q) matings, expending E * 1 E * 2 , the average ejaculate expenditure is
i.e. the same as in the case of no information (equation (9)).
MODE L 3 : T H R E E S PEC I A L C A S E S OF PA RT I A L I N FOR M AT IO N
We now examine the three possible cases where males can recognize only one out of the three female states. In the ¢rst, males can identify only`past risk' (state 2 females, which contain sperm from a past mating), but cannot distinguish between`future risk' and`no risk' females (states 0 and 1). In the second, males can identify only`future risk' (state 1), and in the third, males can identify only`no risk' (state 0) females.
(a) Recognition of past risk
There are two contexts, 2 and (0,1), since males recognize mated females, but cannot discriminate between virgins that will mate only once and those that will mate twice. We therefore seek s* 2 and s 0,1 . Average sperm numbers per mating are hS 0,1 i (s 0,1 qs* 2 )a(1 q) for a mutant playing s 0,1 T s* 0,1 , and hS 2 i (s* 0,1 qs 2 )a(1 q) for a mutant playing s 2 T s* 2 . Thus, À n(s 0,1 , I) n H (s 0,1 , I)
where hS*i (s * 0,1 qs * 2 )a(1 q).
The average value of a mating for the two mutants is given by a pair of equations parallel to those of the previous section, and we thus obtain equations parallel to (11a) and (11b) with s 0,1 substituted for s 1 . By the same technique, we are then able to show that s* 0,1 qs* 2 ;
and hence, s* 0,1`s * 2 , as would be expected. Note that the ratio of sperm numbers in the two contexts is independent of loading factor r. From (15a), (15b), (16) and the analogues of (11a), (11b),
and so for a fair ra¥e,
Solutions for E* 0,1 and E* 2 are plotted against q in ¢gure 3. As evident from (17a) and (17b), whatever the magnitude or direction of the competitive loading (i.e. whether the ¢rst or the second mating is favoured), E * 2 b E * 0,1 , so that curves for E * 2 (¢gure 3b) are above those for E * 0,1 (¢gure 3a), at all intermediate values for q. Under the fair ra¥e, the greatest di¡erence (E * 2 À E * 0,1 ) can be calculated to occur at q 0.38. However, the e¡ect of competitive loading is now more complex: it now exerts an e¡ect because of the asymmetry in information about the risk between contexts. ESS expenditure is always greater when the male mating second is disfavoured (compare pairs of curves in ¢gure 3a or b). This is particularly noticeable in ¢gure 3b: under high competitive disadvantage to the second male, E * 2 rises to a peak at relatively low q (around q 0.1 for r 0.1 curve; ¢gure 3b), and then declines as q increases. Thus, in highly loaded ra¥es, sperm expenditure can decrease with risk over part of the range. Figure 2 . Relation between ESS ejaculate expenditures, E* 1 E* 2 , and the frequency of double mating in the population (risk q) when males have perfect information about female states, and hence ejaculate in three contexts (0), (1), (2). The three lines are for the three degrees of loading in the fertilization ra¥e as in ¢gure 1. The ESS for state 0 females (where there will be no sperm competition), is some arbitrary minimum expenditure E* 1 3 0.
Why do E * 2 and E * 0,1 converge at the limits of q? As q approaches zero, virually no females mate twice. Since the risk of future mating is so tiny, a male mating with a virgin expends only a minute amount of sperm. Thus, a male identifying a mated female has only an in¢nites-simal amount of sperm to compete against (see also Ball & Parker 1998b) . At q 1, all females mate twice, so there is no asymmetry of information between contexts (mated and unmated). Then E* 2 E* 0,1 at all r, and only the ratio (not the direction) of loading is important.
In ¢gure 3, di¡erences between E * 2 and E * 0,1 at given q and r show the variation expected due to intraspeci¢c assessments. Changes across q and r indicate the variation expected across species in relation to their sperm competition risk (q) or mechanism of sperm competition (r). The fact that di¡erence between E* 2 and E* 0,1 is greatest at some intermediate value of q has important implications for comparative studies, as are the distortions due to r. (17a) and (17b) the average relative ejaculate expenditure is
From equations
which always increases with risk (¢gure 4), though not linearly as in ¢gure 1. With a high competitive loading favouring ¢rst matings (e.g. curve for r 0.1), the relation between E * and q may be weak across all but the lowest range of q.
(b) Recognition of future risk
Males can identify future risk, but have no information about past risk. They play s 1 on identifying a future risk female, and s 0,2 on identifying a female that will not mate again in future (it may, or may not, have already mated). We ¢nd expressions relating to s* 0,2 and s* 1 in the same way as before, showing that s * 0,1 qs * 1 ; (20) (cf. equation (16)), and then solve for E * 0,2 and E * 1 . The result is intuitively satisfying: ESS results are equivalent to the previous case but with the loading direction reversed. The same conclusion about inverse loadings applies to the average expenditures, E*, for these two special cases. The ESS is equal to equation (19) with r inversed: a strong ¢rst male advantage in the`past risks' model gives the same e¡ect as an equally strong second male advantage in the`future risks' model. A regression of phylogenetic contrasts for relative testis size (assuming this is equivalent to E*) against sperm competition risk may help to reveal recognition biases across species where sperm competition outcomes are known. Where males can recognize only past risk, such regressions are likely to be characterized at low q by showing species with a strong ¢rst male advantage clustered above the regression line, and those with a strong second male advantage below it. The opposite would be true for species where males can recognize only future risk.
For the case of a fair ra¥e, there are no competitive asymmetries between ejaculates (r 1.0). The average expenditure is then equal for the two cases (recognition of future risk, past risk):
(c) Recognition of zero risk
If males can identify females that will mate only once (`no risk', state 0 females), but cannot discriminate between the two risk states (state 1, 2 females), we obtain exactly the same solutions as already obtained in model 1 for perfect information. If roles are random, the ESS ejaculate expenditure is the same in both risk states (1 and 2)öit does not matter whether a female has already mated or will do so in the future (see equation (13)). Thus the ESS is for males to spend an arbitrary minimum when they identify a female that will mate only once (E* 0 3 0), and to spend
(1 q)r (1 r) 2 when they identify a female that has mated (1), or will mate again (2).
. BIOLO G IC A L EV I DE NC E
The above models make both intra-and interspeci¢c predictions about male strategies. The parameters q and r are ¢xed for a given species, hence their variation in a given model predicts changes across species in which males have the same information. However, within a species, a given model predicts how males respond when they encounter di¡erent sperm competition risk contexts, i.e. the intraspeci¢c variation.
There is widespread comparative evidence that average investment in sperm production increases with the level of sperm competition across species. This pattern has been described across diverse taxa in studies which employ a variety of means to quantify the relationship between sperm production and sperm competition (table 1) . Recent studies of phenotypic plasticity provide evidence also for similar patterns between di¡erent populations within species (He & Tsubaki 1992; table 1) . With few exceptions (e.g. Heske & Ost¢eld 1990; see, also, Brown et al. 1995) , these comparative and population studies support the prediction that where sperm competition approximates to some form of ra¥e, mean relative ejaculate expenditure increases with level of sperm competition. The present paper generates new predictions related to loaded ra¥es; these should now be tested in comparative studies.
As predicted (Parker 1990a,b) , studies of individual variation in ejaculate expenditure within populations suggest a pattern of increased investment in sperm production by males mating consistently in a disadvantaged role with respect to sperm competition and/or experiencing consistently elevated sperm competition risk (e.g. Stockley & Purvis 1993; . Theoretical analyses presented here predict intraspeci¢c ejaculate variation: males are expected to adjust the size of their ejaculate at given matings, investing more where the risk of competition is higher, depending on the loading between roles (¢gures 2, 3). Evidence suggests that males can vary ejaculate size in response to locally perceived risk of sperm competition as revealed by various cues (table 2) . For example, the presence of one or more rivals prior to or during mating may be used to indicate future and/or past risk of sperm competition, leading to an increase in the number of sperm ejaculated (Gage & Baker 1991; Gage 1991; Gage & Barnard 1996) . The type of cue used to assess risk is likely to vary according to species-speci¢c mating patterns. For example, where males commonly guard or consort with females before copulation, the time spent guarding may be a more reliable indicator of`past' risk than the presence of rival males, and evidence suggests that sperm numbers may vary with this cue (Baker & Bellis 1989; Bellis et al. 1990) .
Where males neither congregate around or guard females prior to copulation, female mating status may be a more reliable index of sperm competition risk. Males of some species can assess female mating status and may adjust their ejaculate size accordingly. Indian meal moth males, Plodia interpunctella, do not respond to the presence of rivals but instead respond directly to the amount of sperm within the female, delivering larger ejaculates where the sperm competition level is higher (Cook & Gage 1995) . Paradoxically, male wartbiters, Decticus verrucivorus, deliver more sperm to virgins (Wedell 1992) than to mated females. Males sometimes avoid transferring sperm to mated females that o¡er very poor prospects: such cases are usually easy to interpret. Male 13-lined ground squirrels (Spermophilus tridecemlineatus) su¡er decreasing paternity gains with time after a ¢rst male's copulation. After a critical delay time (matching the predicted optimum), they reject females (Schwagmeyer & Parker 1990 ). In the £y Cyrtodiopsis whitei, the spermatophore acts as a temporary mating plug and second males avoid transferring sperm to mated females (Lorch et al. 1993) , as do male bowl and doily spiders, where ¢rst male sperm precedence is almost complete (Austad 1984) .
Direct assessment of female mating status may not always be a reliable index of sperm competition risk, particularly where there is sexual con£ict over remating decisions. Simmons et al. (1994) found evidence that previously mated female bushcrickets, Requena verticalis, disguise their mating status to avoid male discrimination. Such concealment may be a common female response to sexual con£ict over avoidance of sperm competition + males reared at high larval density invest more in testes and sperm production status as a reference point for likely risk of sperm competition. Male butter£ies (Pieris rapae) produce spermatophores with large numbers of sperm during their second copulation, when they are more likely to encounter previously mated females (Cook & Wedell 1996) . In addition to the direct manipulations of ejaculate size with perceived risk of sperm competition listed (table 2) , behavioural responses such as variation in the frequency or timing of copulation may also lead to ejaculate variation. Male Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep, Ovis canadensis canadensis, perform frequent`retaliatory' copulations with guarded females immediately after forced copulation attempts by rival males, increasing the total number of sperm transferred where perceived sperm competition risk is high (Hogg 1988) . Male zebra ¢nches (Taeniopygia guttata) vary the timing of their copulations to ejaculate more sperm under situations of high sperm competition risk. This is achieved by performing extra-pair copulations (associated with high sperm competition risk), when the number and quality of sperm in reserve for ejaculation are highest (Birkhead et al. 1995) .
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